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        This paper studies the relative contribution of husbands and wives to the family income in the 
process of economic transition by using the Chinese Urban Household Survey data from 1988 to 1999.   
We find that, contrary to the experience of western countries, the share of wives’ labor earnings in 
urban China tends to decline slightly over time and the share of husbands’ labor earnings is stable. This 
implies that the role of urban Chinese husbands as the main financial supporters of their families 
becomes relatively more important during economic transition.    We argue that this trend may have 
reflected the restoration of the functions of household production and labor market in the process of 
economic transition.    This restoration allows households to allocate time, effort and human capital 
investment for each household member and for each household and market activity in a more efficient 
way.    Our further empirical analysis suggests that having young children was the only observable 
factor that has accounted for the strengthening of the relative importance of husbands in contributing to 
family income in urban China.   3
1 Introduction 
The role of women in the Chinese society has changed dramatically in the past century.    In 
traditional China, wives took on all the housework and husbands were the major breadwinners.    When 
the Communist Party founded the new China in 1949, it started to abolish many traditions.    In 
particular, women, who were holding up half of the sky according to official slogans, were encouraged 
to enter the workforce. More importantly, starting from the early 1950s, the Communist Party began to 
establish a planned economy, which dramatically changed the behaviors of households and firms.    The 
state essentially did not allow unemployment or people to stay out of the labor market, and assigned a 
job to almost all urban laborers.    Moreover, the function of families such as childcare was socialized in 
such a way that individual families could not even make many decisions on family activities.    Firms 
were also under central planning, and had an egalitarian pay system that rewarded neither human capital 
nor work effort. 
The Chinese society has been undergoing further change since the transition from a planned 
economy to a market economy started in the late 1970s.    With the rapid development of the Chinese 
economy and in particular the labor market, there are more job opportunities for women.    Not 
surprisingly, many believe that women are still holding up half of the economic sky by being important 
wage earners.    However, others do not agree.    Some scholars argue that economic transition seems to 
hurt women more than men in terms of labor market opportunities.    As a result, the role of men as a 
wage earner may have become more important during the transition process.    Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that there is a trend that women are returning to the home, as was the case in traditional   4
Chinese society.    Despite this debate, little is known about how the roles of husbands and wives in 
wage earning have evolved in the transition process in China. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the changes in the role of husbands and wives as financial 
supporters of their families in urban China during economic transition.    We employ very rich urban 
survey data covering six provinces for the period of 1988-1999.    These data not only allow us to 
examine how the role of husbands and wives in contributing to family income has evolved over time, 
but also allow us to examine factors that affect this evolution.     
We argue that the contributions of wives to family income may have become less important during 
the process of economic transition from the planned regime to the market regime in China. In the 
planned regime, the sexual division of labor as asserted by Becker (1981 and 1985) may not be obvious, 
because households could not freely allocate their time and effort and because effort and human capital 
were not rewarded.    Thus, as a result of economic planning, women may have worked longer in the 
market than they would in a well-functioning market economy.    According to a family survey 
conducted in 1982, 81 percent of Chinese urban women worked outside, and the percentage was only 
slightly lower than that of men (Tsui, 1989).    Economic transition in China is a process of restoring the 
labor market and household production roles, as those assumed by Becker (1981, 1985), and as a result, 
women may do less market work and are paid less. 
Our empirical work generates some interesting findings that support the transition argument.   
First, we find that although a lot of wives work in the labor market in urban China, husbands 
contribute more to the family income than their wives for the whole sample period.    Moreover, the   5
husband-wife gap in contribution increases over time in the process of economic transition.    Second, 
we also find that the monetary contribution of wives to their families falls and that of husbands 
increases with the number of young children.    These findings seem to suggest that having young 
children has become an important factor that makes husbands contribute more to family income and 
wives contribute less, as asserted by Becker (1981, 1985).    Third, we find that other factors either 
have no effect on the gender gap or tend to reduce the gap.    Moreover, there is still a large and rising 
gender gap that cannot be explained by the different returns to observable individual or household 
attributes.    Finally, we find that although there is a husband-wife gap in labor force participation, it 
is not a main reason for the large and rising husband-wife income gap.    In other words, both the 
wage gap and the gap in work hours may have also contributed to the income gap. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section briefly reviews the 
literature on the relative role of wives and husbands in contributing to family income and derives our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 reports the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Literature and Hypotheses 
Becker (1973, 1974, 1981, 1985) was the pioneer in investigating how a family allocates the time 
and effort of each family member in household and market activities so as to maximize the family’s 
well-being.    The household maximization will result in a larger contribution of family income by men 
than women because men work longer and harder in the market, and invest more in market-oriented 
human capital. According to Becker (1981), each family member allocates his/her time between   6
household work and market work according to his/her comparative advantage.    For biological reasons, 
women are committed to bearing and feeding children, and thus have a comparative advantage in the 
production and care of children.    When women stay at home caring for children, they could also easily 
do other housework, which means that they also have a comparative advantage in this area. Thus, the 
biological difference between women and men will result in the sexual division of labor in families: 
women spend more time working in the household, while men spend more time working in the market 
sector.    Therefore, one would expect that the contribution of women to family income is smaller than 
that of men. 
The sexual division of labor is reinforced by the investment in specific human capital and the 
allocation of effort by family members for each activity (Becker, 1981, 1985).    Because women spend 
more time in household production, they will invest more in acquiring the human capital for household 
production.    In contrast, men will invest more in acquiring the human capital for market work.   
Because of the difference in human capital, men will be paid more than women per hour of market work.   
Becker (1985) also argues that a person also allocates his/her effort across all household and market 
activities.    Women, who conduct effort-intensive household work such as childcare, would exert less 
effort in market work, and thus be paid less for an hour of market work than men even if they have the 
same human capital and work hours as men. 
The model can be used to analyze the relative role of the husband and wife in contributing to family 
income during the process of economic transition in China.    China may be a very special case for 
analysis.    As a developing country, we should expect the role of a woman in contributing to family   7
income to become more important in the process of development, in which the effort intensity of 
household work decreases with the improvement of home production technology.    However, as a 
transition economy, which is moving from a planned regime to a market regime, the role of women in 
China in contributing to family income may also be marginalized in the process of transition.     
  A number of key assumptions in the models of Becker (1981, 1985) do not hold in a planned 
regime.    First, households cannot freely allocate their time in a planned economy.    In the planned 
regime, all urban laborers were encouraged to enter employment and the majority of them were assigned 
a job by the state.    The state essentially did not allow unemployment or people to stay out of the labor 
market.    Moreover, the function of families was socialized in such a way that individual families could 
not make many decisions on family production.    For example, after having a baby, an urban woman 
was given 56 days maternal leave, which was uniform nationally.    After the leave, she had to go back 
to work, and the baby could automatically enter a state-owned kindergarten without any charges.    Thus, 
essentially, women could not choose to have more household production, such as caring for young 
children, even if they wanted to.    This means that the market work time for women and men did not 
differ much, and women may have spent more time in market work than they really would have 
preferred had they been part of a well-functioning market economy.     
Second, the pay system was egalitarian in the planned regime, with the wage rates for people of 
different professions, educations and sexes determined by the central planner without much variation. 
This means that neither the human capital nor the work effort was rewarded in the planned regime.   
Because of this, both men and women did not have incentives to invest in human capital for market   8
work or to exert effort in market work.    As a result, the reinforcing effect of the sexual division of labor 
as emphasized by Becker (1981, 1985) was not important during the planned regime.   
Economic transition in China is a process of restoring the labor market and household production 
roles.    Gradually, people have been allowed to choose not to work, to be unemployed, and wages rates 
are determined by the market, which reflects both the human capital and effort levels of individuals.    In 
other words, economic transition has removed many constraints to families on their household and labor 
decisions, and households can make better allocation of time, human capital investment, and work effort 
for each member as modeled by Becker (1981, 1985).    This means that the biological difference 
between women and men will result in women allocating more time in household production and less in 
market work, and therefore women contributing less than men in family income.    Moreover, the 
restoration of the pay for human capital and effort market mechanism will restore the reinforcing effect 
of this sexual division of labor.    This leads to our first hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The contribution of women to family income may decrease in the process of transition. 
 
Becker’s model can also be used to analyze factors that could affect the division of labor and thus 
the contribution of husbands and wives in family income.    In this paper, we focus on three factors, 
young children, non-labor income, and adult co-residents.    First, the increase in the number of young 
children would increase the needed housework time as well as the effort of women and thus reduce their 
time and effort for market work.    Therefore, children should exert an unambiguously negative effect on   9
the income contribution of women. 
Second, non-labor income may also affect the relative income contributions of husbands and wives.   
Assuming that leisure is a normal good, a rise in family non-labor income would induce husbands and 
wives to spend more time and effort on leisure activities and less on market activities. As a result of this 
income effect, market work time, effort and wage rate of both husbands and wives would be lowered. 
The magnitudes of the reductions in income contribution of husbands and wives resulting from the 
increase in family non-labor income would depend on the sizes of income effects.    Thus, whether the 
relative income contribution of women increases or decreases with non-labor income is a purely 
empirical question. 
Finally, the existence of non-parental adult co-residents may also affect the relative contribution of 
husbands and wives.    On one hand, since adult co-residents generally provide financial support to the 
families, they have the same effect as non-labor income.    On the other hand, additional non-parental 
adults increase the demand for household production. This affects the incentives to supply household 
consumption and may alter the incentives for specialization.    More specifically, the number of adult 
co-residents may be correlated with an increase or decrease of the household work burden of wives and 
a depression or increase of their market work time and effort.
1    Again, the effect of non-parental adult 
co-residents on the relative income contribution of husbands and wives is a purely empirical question. 
We summarize the effects of children, non-labor income and non-parental co-resident adults in 
                                                 
1  Rosenbaum and Gilbertson (1995) find that the labor force participation of wives decreases significantly for those households with a great increase in the 
number of co-resident adults.   10
Hypothesis 2. 
  
Hypothesis 2: The number of young children tends to reduce the wife’s contribution to family income; 
non-labor income and the number of adult co-residents may also affect the wife’s contribution to family 
income, but the signs of these effects are ambiguous. 
 
3 Data 
The data used in this paper come from the Urban Household Survey of China from 1988 to 1999 
conducted by the Urban Socio-Economic Survey Organization of the State Statistical Bureau of China.   
The samples were randomly drawn from urban households in six regions that cover a considerable 
number of urban areas, including those in Beijing, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Sichuan and 
Shaanxi. The survey had a random sample for each year, and thus we have 12 years of repeated 
cross-sectional data rather than panel data.    The survey includes detailed information on income and 
demographic characteristics, which we draw on to analyze the role of husbands and wives in their 
contributions to family income. 
In this paper, we only use a sample of those families in which there are both husbands and wives.   
As a result, single families, single-parent families and widow families are excluded.    On top of this, 
those families in which either or both spouses were self-employed are also excluded in the analysis since 
the earning pattern of self-employed persons is different from that of wage earners.    Table A1 
summarizes all variables.   11
One issue of concern is how to deal with people who are retired in our sample.    Table A2 gives the 
distribution of non-participants by reasons.    Retirement is indeed the major reason for both men and 
women to withdraw from the labor force.    The table shows that almost all men who were out of the labor 
force were due to retirement.    For women, about 80 percent of the non-participants are retirees, and the 
rest stayed out of the labor market because they chose to do housework or for some other reasons.    To 
avoid the compounding problem of retirement, we restrict our regression analysis to a sample with both 
husbands and wives being non-retirees.     
 
4 Empirical Analyses 
4.1 The Changes in Relative Income Contribution of Husbands and Wives   
We follow Machin and Waldfogel (1994) and use the share of the labor income of an individual in 
total family income to measure the income contribution of each family member. More specifically, this 
index is defined as follows: 
          Share of individual’s labor income in total family income   
= Annual labor income of an individual / Total annual family income 
We start our analysis of the evolution of the relative importance of husbands and wives in contributing to 
family income in urban China during economic transition by exploring this simple index.     
Some preliminary analysis of the data seems to support Hypothesis 1.    Table 1 reveals that the 
share of husbands’ labor income is generally greater than that of wives’ over the 12-year horizon.   
Although the husbands’ share is largely stable over the period (around 0.4), the wives’ share has fallen   12
slightly from 0.306 in 1988 to 0.272 in 1999, which leads to a widening of the gap between the 
husbands’ share and the wives’ share from 0.093 in 1988 to 0.129 in 1999. This trend suggests that the 
importance of Chinese urban wives as financial supporters of families has declined slightly during 
economic transition. 
Following Harkness et al. (1997), we explore the evolution of the income structure by examining 
the distribution of these shares over selected years, i.e., 1988, 1994 and 1999.    Figure 1 shows, not 
surprisingly, that the fraction of wives who have no monetary contribution to families (0 shares) is 
remarkably greater than the fraction of husbands for all three years. Interestingly, the fraction of wives 
with no contribution increases from 0.138 in 1988 to 0.235 in 1999 whereas the fraction of husbands 
with no contribution increases from 0.08 in 1988 to 0.156 in 1999.
2  These figures reflect that the 
increase in the fraction of wives is slightly greater than that of husbands (0.097 versus 0.076).    This 
finding regarding the lower end of the distributions again shows the shrinkage of the relative importance 
of wives in contributing to their family income. The same story can be told when we move to the upper 
end of the distributions.    The fraction of wives who contribute more than 70 percent of total family 
income increases only by 0.04 from 1988 to 1999, but the fraction of husbands who contribute more 
than 70 percent increases by a large 0.128 for the same period. These results again support Hypothesis 1. 
We further divide the sample into ten decile groups according to the total income level of the 
families, with the first decile constituted by the lowest 10 percent and the tenth decile constituted by the 
                                                 
2  For additional information, there are 5.64 percent couples in which both husbands and wives do not contribute economically to their families in 1988. The 
percentage increases to 8.52 percent in 1994 and 11.04 percent in 1999.     13
highest 10 percent. Analysis with deciles reported in Table 2 shows that the labor income share 
differential between husbands and wives generally increases over time for all but the richest three 
deciles.    Moreover, the differential decreases when we move down from the poorest decile to the 




The above simple descriptive analysis shows a widening gap between husbands and wives in their 
share of labor income. We will turn to regressions to examine whether such a gap still exists after 
controlling for other covariates.    The regression equation is specified as follows: 
       t it it t 1 t 0 t ε Variable Control β Dummy Husband β β C + + + = ∑ ,       ( 1 )  
where the dependent variable Ct represents the percentage of the labor earnings of either the husband or 
wife in total family income at time t,  β s are coefficients to be estimated, and ε is the disturbance term. 
The husband dummy is a dummy variable which equals one for husbands and zero for wives. The 
estimated β1t will show how much more or less husbands contribute to the family relatively to their 
wives. The control variables that are used include age, age squared, years of education, the number of 
children, the number of adult co-residents, family non-labor income and provincial dummies. 
The regression results confirm Hypothesis 1 and the earlier findings that the husband is more 
important than the wife in contributing to family income, and the husband-wife gap is widening over 
                                                 
3  This could reflect the age effect, since older people are more likely to be in the higher deciles (older people earn more and have more wage earners in the 
household, such as children).   14
years.    As shown in Table 3, the husband dummy is positive and significant at the one percent level for 
all years. Generally speaking, the coefficient on the husband dummy increases over the sample period.   
In 1988, husbands contribute 8.5 percent more than their wives to family income, but this number 
increases to 12.5 percent in 1999. 
To test whether the rise of the husband-wife gap over time is statistically significant, we run a 
regression to the pooled sample of all years.    We add year as a variable to control for year trend, with 
the assumption that the change of the income share is linear over time.    We also include the interaction 
of year and the husband dummy to test whether there is a significant trend of the husband-wife gap over 
time. The results in the last column of Table 3 show that the husband dummy is still positive and 
significant, with the magnitude of 7.8.    The interaction term is indeed positive and significant, with the 
magnitude of 0.5, suggesting that the husband-wife gap increases around half a percentage point a year. 
In summary, the above analysis shows that husbands contribute increasingly more to the family 
income than their wives.    These results seem to support our view that economic transition has restored 
the conditions assumed by Becker.    In particular, when these conditions hold, wives may choose to do 
more household production and less market work, or wives may be paid less than their husbands in the 
market.    In the next subsection, we will examine the factors that may have contributed to the 
husband-wife gap. 
 
4.3 Why Has the Husband-Wife Gap Widened Over Time? 
The finding that the husband-wife gap in income shares widens over time raises an interesting   15
question: Why has it happened?    To trace the reasons for the changes, the econometric model is 
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    (2)   
where we interact all control variables, i.e., age, age squared, education, the number of children, the 
number of co-residents and non-labor income, indexed by j, with the husband dummy. These interaction 
terms will pick up any additional effect the control variables have on the husband’s relative income on 
top of the effect they have on the wife’s relative income.    In other words, these interaction terms will 
help to explain why there is a husband-wife gap in the relative income, and why this gap is widening 
over time. 
Regression results reported in Table 4 show that when we allow the effect of all variables to differ 
between the husbands and wives, there is an even larger unexplained husband-wife gap. Note that the 
coefficients on the husband dummy become much larger compared to those in Table 3.    Since the 
husband dummy measures the husband-wife gap that cannot be explained by observable variables, it 
means that controlling for the effect of other variables, there is a larger unexplained gender gap.   
Moreover, the interaction term year*husband also becomes larger, suggesting that the unexplained part 
of the gap is also rising faster than that is estimated in the previous table. 
The interaction terms of the husband dummy with other variables have both individual and joint 
explanatory power in the regressions.    To make sure that these interaction terms have explaining power, 
we test their joint significance. The test results show that they are jointly significant at the one percent   16
level.    As for individual interaction terms, note first that increasing human capital helps to reduce the 
husband-wife  gap.  The  variable  education*husband  has  a negative coefficient and is significant at the 
one percent level in all years, suggesting that education increases the wives’ income ratio by a larger 
amount than increasing the husband’s income ratio.   
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Table 4 shows that the number of young (preschool, school-age and 
adolescent) children in general widens the husband-wife income gap.    Note that the coefficients on the 
children variables are almost all negative and are significant in most cases.    Since we also have the 
interactions of the husband dummy with the children variables, these children variables pick up the 
effect for wives (husband dummy = 0).    This implies that having more young children tends to reduce 
the income share of wives. 
Another interesting result from Table 4 is that while young children tend to reduce the wife’s 
income share, they increase the husband’s income share.
4    Take the effect of the preschool children in 
1988 as an example.    The coefficient on the number of preschool children itself is negative and 
significant at the five percent level.    The magnitude of -1.988 means that one more preschool child in 
1988 reduces the income share of the wife (the base group) by 1.988 percent.    However, since the 
interaction term is positive, the total effect of the preschool child on the husband’s income share is a 
                                                 
4  One might be concerned that samples from later years are more likely to be affected by the one-child policy, and thus may have a smaller variation in these 
children variables.    However, even if they are subject to the one-child policy, they still differ in the timing of having the first child, and thus in the number 
of children in each age group.    The variation of the children variables can be seen from Table A1.    Note that although the standard deviation for the 
children variables, e.g., the number of pre-school children, decreases with time, so does the mean.    Moreover, the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, 
a normalized measure of the variation for a variable, does not decrease with time.    For example, the ratio for the number of pre-school children is 2.1 in 
1988 (0.39/0.185), but it is as large as 3.5 for 1999 (0.26/0.074).    The same pattern is true for the other three children variables.   17
positive 2.691 percent in 1988.
5 
Adult children living with parents may also affect the income share of the wife and husband.    To a 
certain extent, adult children have earning power and are able to provide financial support to their 
families, and thus their appearance reduces the income share of both wives and husbands.    Moreover, 
income-making adult children may reduce the incentives of parents to work more, and thus reduce their 
labor supply and incomes. Regressions results indeed show that the presence of adult children (18 years 
old or above) reduces the income share of both wives and husbands, and it reduces that of both wives 
and husbands similarly.     
Our analysis with adult co-residents shows that co-residents tend to reduce the income share of 
both husbands and wives, and it reduces that of the husbands more in certain years.    The co-resident 
variable has a negative and significant coefficient in all years, meaning that having one more co-resident 
reduces the income share of both husbands and wives.    The interaction terms are mostly negative and 
are significant only for later years.    Therefore, co-resident adults have helped to reduce the 
husband-wife income gap in later years. 
Finally, we test whether non-labor income (including those incomes such as interest income, 
dividend income and income from supporters, gifts, boarders and selling property) affects the 
husband-wife income gap.    The non-labor income variable should measure the income effect on the 
demand for leisure for husbands and wives.    The coefficients on non-labor income are negative and 
                                                 
5  This is obtained by adding up the coefficient of the number of preschool children and the coefficient of the interaction term of that variable in Table 4. For 
example, in this case -1.988 plus 4.679 results in 2.691. A similar calculation method applies to the other variables with husband interaction terms. This 
result is partially consistent with the finding using US data (see e.g., Cain, 1966; Waite, 1980; Sorensen, 1983), which shows that women’s labor force 
participation is negatively related to the presence of preschool children.   18
significant at the one percent level in all years and the coefficients on the interaction terms are negative 
and significant for most years.    This suggests that, consistent with theoretical predictions in the 
literature, leisure should be a normal good to both husbands and wives.    Furthermore, the negative 
interaction term means that the positive income effect on the leisure of husbands is larger than that of 
their wives. 
As a caveat, we should be careful in interpreting the results regarding the number of children, 
co-residing adults and non-labor income.    Generally speaking, these variables may be treated as 
exogenous in our context.    For example, the number of children could be treated as exogenous to the 
extent that it is predetermined relative to the allocation of labor or time.    Non-labor income is also 
generally treated as exogenous to labor decisions in the literature.    However, as is well known, these 
variables are related to household decisions that are jointly determined with household time allocation as 
well as the labor income of each individual. Thus, all these variables could be endogenous.    Given the 
limitations of the data, dealing with the endogeneity problem is beyond our scope. 
 
4.4 Robustness Tests 
In the above analysis, we have restricted to a sample with both the husband and wife being 
non-retirees.    Although retirement is a major reason for non-participation, there are other reasons.    As 
shown by Table A2, a significant number of women chose to stay home for reasons other than retirement, 
but very few men did so.    In other words, there seems to be a participation gap other than the reason of 
retirement.    To test how non-participation (other than that caused by retirement) has affected our results,   19
we go a step further, and remove those households with either husband or wife not participating in the 
labor force (non-retirees are also removed). 
We find that although participation may have contributed to the husband-wife earnings gap, it may 
not be the main reason for the gap.    The top panel of Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients on the 
husband dummy as well as the year*husband interaction of regressions with the same specification as 
those in Table 3, but with a smaller sample. The estimated coefficients on both the husband dummy and 
the year*husband interaction are slightly smaller than those in Table 3, suggesting that the participation 
gap may have contributed to the earnings gap.    However, there remains a large and increasing gender 
earnings gap even to this more restricted sample of participants.    When we use the specification of 
Table 4 (with interactions) to the sample of participants, we still find a large and increasing gender 
earnings gap (the lower panel of Table 5).    This means that participation itself is not a main reason for 
the husband-wife income gap.    The gap in this restricted sample is either due to the gap in working 
hours or due to the wage gap. 
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the relative importance of husbands and wives as financial supporters of 
their families in urban China during the transition period from 1988 to 1999, by using data from the 
Urban Household Survey of China.    We find that the husband-wife gap in contributing to family 
income increases over time in the process of economic transition.    We argue that this is a result of 
economic transition, which has restored the labor market and household production.       20
We further explore whether factors of household production and the labor market affect the 
relative contribution of wives in a way predicted by Becker’s model, and find supporting evidence.   
In particular, we find that the relative monetary contribution of wives falls and that of husbands 
increases with the number of young children.    These findings seem to suggest that having young 
children is becoming an important factor that makes husbands contribute more to family income and 
wives contribute less.    Third, we find that having other adult family members does not change the 
relative role of husbands and wives in contribution, but non-labor income seems to favor men.   
Finally, we find that although the husband-wife gap in labor force participation widens over time, it 
cannot fully explain the husband-wife income gap. 
With reference to the experience of western countries, one might have expected that wives in China 
have been gradually holding up the half of the sky during the development process. However, contrary 
to this expectation, this paper finds that the percentage share of wives’ labor earning tends to decline 
slightly over time. Wives to a certain extent have not swum upward financially during economic 
transition.    Rather, the traditional division of labor between husbands and wives tends to be 
strengthening slightly over time in urban China.    However, this may not be a bad thing in terms of 
efficiency of the economy.    The restrictions in the planned era, which were against intra-household 
specializations, have been removed during economic transition.    Thus, households can make better 
choices regarding their household and labor market inputs and effort, as has been asserted by Becker 
(1981 and 1985).    In this sense, reforms have restored efficiency.   21
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Table 1: Average Share of Each Income Source in Total Annual Family Income in Urban China, 1988-1999 
         









 A  B  C=A-B  D  E  F 
           
1988  0.399  0.306 0.093 0.048  0.002  0.242 
1989  0.388  0.294 0.094 0.053  0.001  0.262 
1990  0.390  0.295 0.096 0.052  0.002  0.260 
1991  0.395  0.290 0.105 0.051  0.002  0.260 
1992  0.424  0.321 0.103 0.063  0.002  0.186 
1993  0.425  0.314 0.112 0.065  0.001  0.193 
1994  0.421  0.297 0.125 0.064  0.002  0.216 
1995  0.427  0.307 0.120 0.064  0.002  0.200 
1996  0.420  0.299 0.122 0.061  0.001  0.217 
1997 0.418  0.291  0.127  0.060 0.001  0.229 
1998  0.409  0.281 0.128 0.059  0.003  0.247 
1999  0.401  0.272 0.129 0.059  0.002  0.265 
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Table 2: Average Share of Husbands’ and Wives’ Annual Labor Income in Total Annual Family Income in Urban China, by 
Family Income Decile Groups, 1988-1999 (to be continued) 
 
Panel A: Mean of the share of husbands’ labor income to family income in each decile group 
Family income 
decile groups  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1 0.360    0.326    0.355    0.383  0.452  0.453  0.418  0.422  0.445    0.476  0.469  0.462 
2 0.405    0.395    0.396    0.416  0.434  0.442  0.444  0.444  0.446    0.452  0.429  0.430 
3 0.425    0.418    0.402    0.413  0.451  0.433  0.456  0.446  0.435    0.450  0.440  0.381 
4 0.423    0.417    0.418    0.430  0.460  0.432  0.407  0.450  0.411    0.421  0.420  0.427 
5 0.420    0.412    0.409    0.411  0.456  0.428  0.438  0.424  0.424    0.409  0.402  0.407 
6 0.411    0.415    0.417    0.396  0.433  0.434  0.424  0.416  0.411    0.428  0.400  0.389 
7 0.406    0.399    0.403    0.396  0.404  0.433  0.422  0.436  0.419    0.403  0.405  0.390 
8 0.392    0.384    0.382    0.375  0.397  0.409  0.417  0.430  0.419    0.383  0.394  0.374 
9 0.379    0.353    0.375    0.368  0.382  0.396  0.403  0.415  0.392    0.375  0.357  0.382 
10 0.367    0.361    0.345    0.364  0.371  0.394  0.385  0.385  0.404    0.383  0.378  0.369 
              
Panel B: Mean of the share of wives’ labor income to family income in each decile group 
Family income 
decile groups  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1 0.199    0.201    0.190    0.225  0.278  0.279  0.238  0.244  0.259    0.255    0.233  0.218 
2 0.323    0.287    0.293    0.288  0.325  0.310  0.284  0.307  0.287    0.303    0.267  0.263 
3 0.330    0.319    0.323    0.304  0.348  0.321  0.319  0.333  0.329    0.301    0.285  0.258 
4 0.345    0.329    0.335    0.313  0.361  0.336  0.311  0.338  0.304    0.295    0.293  0.286 
5 0.333    0.347    0.311    0.319  0.358  0.345  0.312  0.321  0.295    0.309    0.285  0.268 
6 0.327    0.321    0.338    0.316  0.351  0.330  0.320  0.316  0.314    0.304    0.299  0.284 
7 0.338    0.308    0.325    0.288  0.331  0.323  0.296  0.334  0.307    0.281    0.285  0.293 
8 0.305    0.288    0.292    0.291  0.297  0.315  0.319  0.303  0.319    0.295    0.295  0.287 
9 0.287    0.275    0.291    0.282  0.294  0.286  0.287  0.293  0.292    0.291    0.279  0.289 
10 0.276    0.269    0.247    0.276  0.272  0.292  0.280  0.279  0.283    0.272    0.292  0.278 
              
Panel C: Differential in the mean share of labor income (Husband’s share - Wife’s share) 
Family income 
decile groups  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1 0.161    0.124    0.165    0.159  0.174  0.174  0.180  0.178  0.186    0.221    0.235  0.243 
2 0.083    0.108    0.103    0.128  0.108  0.132  0.160  0.136  0.158    0.149    0.162  0.167 
3 0.095    0.099    0.079    0.109  0.103  0.111  0.137  0.114  0.106    0.149    0.155  0.123 
4 0.078    0.087    0.083    0.117  0.099  0.096  0.097  0.112  0.107    0.126    0.127  0.141 
5 0.087    0.065    0.098    0.092  0.097  0.083  0.126  0.103  0.129    0.100    0.117  0.139 
6 0.084    0.093    0.079    0.080  0.082  0.104  0.103  0.100  0.096    0.124    0.101  0.105 
7 0.068    0.092    0.078    0.108  0.073  0.110  0.126  0.102  0.112    0.122    0.120  0.096 
8 0.087    0.097    0.090    0.084  0.100  0.094  0.098  0.127  0.101    0.088    0.099  0.088 
9 0.092    0.078    0.084    0.086  0.089  0.110  0.116  0.122  0.100    0.084    0.078  0.093 
10 0.091    0.092    0.098    0.087  0.099  0.102  0.105  0.106  0.121    0.111    0.086  0.091 
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Table 2: Average Share of Husbands’ and Wives’ Annual Labor Income in Total Annual Family Income in Urban China, by 
Family Income Decile Groups, 1988-1999 (second part) 
 
Panel D: Mean of the share of adult children’s labor income to family income in each decile group 
Family income 
decile groups  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1 0.017    0.019    0.021    0.010  0.006  0.009  0.018  0.016  0.013    0.021    0.017  0.019 
2 0.019    0.010    0.017    0.008  0.013  0.016  0.019  0.018  0.019    0.018    0.024  0.026 
3 0.012    0.015    0.015    0.014  0.021  0.023  0.025  0.029  0.030    0.022    0.030  0.031 
4 0.025    0.026    0.021    0.024  0.020  0.036  0.040  0.029  0.031    0.042    0.035  0.036 
5 0.032    0.025    0.028    0.021  0.045  0.038  0.041  0.053  0.051    0.036    0.049  0.048 
6 0.028    0.031    0.027    0.034  0.044  0.069  0.065  0.064  0.061    0.047    0.049  0.054 
7 0.044    0.058    0.043    0.055  0.076  0.076  0.074  0.066  0.065    0.064    0.064  0.060 
8 0.077    0.084    0.087    0.090  0.114 0.112 0.073  0.089  0.069    0.094    0.078  0.093 
9 0.108    0.128    0.109    0.120  0.138  0.129  0.125  0.120  0.128    0.106    0.120  0.097 
10 0.121    0.128    0.155    0.132  0.154  0.144  0.156  0.159  0.142    0.151    0.122  0.127 
              
Panel E: Mean of the share of other co-residing adults’ labor income to family income in each decile group 
Family income 
decile groups  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1 0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000    0.001    0.002  0.003 
2 0.001    0.000    0.000    0.000  0.000  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.001    0.001    0.004  0.002 
3 0.000    0.000    0.001    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.003    0.003    0.000  0.001 
4 0.000    0.000    0.002    0.000  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.002  0.002    0.000    0.004  0.000 
5 0.001    0.000    0.000    0.000  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000    0.001  0.002 
6 0.001    0.001    0.000    0.003  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.002    0.000    0.002  0.002 
7 0.001    0.001    0.002    0.002  0.003  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.000    0.003    0.003  0.001 
8 0.003    0.001    0.002    0.006  0.004  0.002  0.001  0.003  0.002    0.004    0.003  0.003 
9 0.008    0.007    0.004    0.005  0.004  0.002  0.004  0.001  0.001    0.000    0.003  0.001 
10 0.004    0.001    0.004    0.004  0.006  0.003  0.003  0.004  0.002    0.002    0.004  0.002 
              
Panel F: Mean of the share of non-labor income to family income in each decile group 
Family income 
decile groups  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1 0.424    0.454    0.433    0.382  0.263  0.259  0.326  0.317  0.281    0.247    0.279  0.297 
2 0.251    0.307    0.293    0.287  0.227  0.228  0.250  0.230  0.247    0.225    0.276  0.277 
3 0.233    0.247    0.257    0.268  0.179  0.222  0.199  0.191  0.202    0.223    0.244  0.328 
4 0.206    0.227    0.224    0.231  0.157  0.195  0.239  0.180  0.252    0.242    0.246  0.252 
5 0.213    0.216    0.252    0.247  0.137  0.187  0.208  0.200  0.228    0.243    0.264  0.275 
6 0.229    0.230    0.216    0.249  0.165  0.165  0.188  0.203  0.211    0.220    0.249  0.270 
7 0.207    0.231    0.226    0.256  0.182  0.165  0.205  0.160  0.209    0.246    0.243  0.255 
8 0.220    0.240    0.235    0.237  0.183  0.161  0.188  0.172  0.188    0.225    0.229  0.243 
9 0.212    0.234    0.219    0.225  0.178  0.185  0.181  0.171  0.186    0.226    0.241  0.231 
10 0.226    0.238    0.246    0.222  0.188  0.167  0.175  0.172  0.168    0.192    0.203  0.225 
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Table 3: OLS Regressions Examining the Share of Labor Income of Husbands versus Wives in Total Family Income in Urban China, 1988-1999  
  Dependent variable: percentage of one’s labor earnings in total family income 
  1988  1989  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  All 
Husband  8.451*** 8.238*** 8.345***  9.247***  9.225***  10.331*** 11.681*** 10.961*** 11.503*** 12.181*** 11.368*** 12.548***  7.784*** 
 (27.50)  (25.33)  (28.11)  (28.89) (30.40) (29.50)  (30.80) (27.95) (28.12) (27.54) (24.28) (24.48) (42.95) 
                 
Age  1.575***  1.532***  1.145*** 1.302*** 1.673*** 1.368*** 1.121*** 1.191*** 1.251*** 1.193*** 1.421*** 1.486*** 1.683*** 
 (7.84)  (7.44)  (5.48)  (6.08)  (7.38) (5.76) (4.76) (4.39) (4.68) (4.67) (5.51) (5.42)  (23.92) 
Age  squared  -0.019***  -0.019***  -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.020*** 
 (8.23)  (7.70)  (5.57)  (6.31)  (7.57) (6.07) (4.88) (4.46) (4.81) (4.65) (5.27) (5.50)  (24.62) 
Education  0.649***  0.672***  0.635*** 0.687*** 0.571*** 0.608*** 0.720*** 0.737*** 0.761*** 0.813*** 0.929*** 1.206*** 0.725*** 
 (12.16)  (11.88)  (11.54)  (12.27) (10.93) (10.05)  (11.30) (10.93) (10.57) (10.74) (11.83) (14.18) (38.58) 
N o .   o f   c h i l d r e n                
    Preschool  0.414  -1.087*  0.096 -1.149  -3.750***  -2.572***  -0.520 -0.060 -0.811 -0.063 1.084 -1.157  -1.194*** 
 (0.64)  (1.80)  (0.16)  (1.60)  (5.78) (2.93) (0.60) (0.07) (0.81) (0.06) (1.05) (1.05) (5.27) 
    School  age  0.069  -0.707*  -0.043 -0.430  -4.253***  -2.038***  -0.630 -0.170 -0.764  -1.242*  -0.940  -1.951**  -1.393*** 
 (0.19)  (1.76)  (0.11)  (0.93)  (6.96) (3.31) (1.04) (0.28) (1.08) (1.75) (1.27) (2.35) (9.97) 
    Adolescent  -1.055***  -1.058***  -0.825**  -1.050**  -2.073***  -2.208***  -0.754 -0.698 -0.822 -0.934 -0.733 -1.088  -1.809*** 
 (2.73)  (2.68)  (2.16)  (2.38)  (4.10) (3.65) (1.27) (1.10) (1.18) (1.26) (0.93) (1.16)  (13.79) 
    Adult  -4.238***  -4.596***  -4.488*** -5.099*** -6.860*** -7.459*** -6.933*** -6.530*** -6.535*** -6.997*** -6.433*** -6.567*** -6.093*** 
 (12.06)  (12.93)  (14.25)  (14.29) (19.26) (18.13)  (15.99) (13.82) (13.46) (14.03) (10.89)  (9.11)  (51.34) 
                 
No.  of  adult  -2.325***  -1.957***  -2.399*** -2.396*** -4.721*** -4.135*** -4.112*** -4.192*** -3.876*** -4.510*** -4.945*** -4.852*** -3.119*** 
co-residents (6.59) (5.21) (5.73) (6.37) (13.65)  (9.15) (9.11) (9.31) (8.07) (9.83) (9.94) (8.25)  (27.59) 
                 
Non-labor  -0.005***  -0.003***  -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Income (13.42)  (17.08)  (8.37)  (6.30)  (12.54) (15.66) (11.77) (12.65) (13.17) (18.08) (20.41) (11.93) (27.55) 
                 
Year                 -0.145*** 
                 ( 6 . 2 0 )  
                 
Year*husband                 0.472*** 
                 (14.49) 
                 
Observations  5006  4518  5220 5352 6448 5746 5626 5662 5546 5650 5482 5092  65348 
R-squared 0.37  0.34  0.35 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.29 
Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; All regressions include provincial dummies. All economic variables are derived using the 1988 price 
level.   27
 
Table 4: OLS Regressions Examining the Share of Labor Income of Husbands versus Wives in Total Family Income in Urban China, 1988-1999 
  Dependent variable: percentage of one’s labor earnings in total family income 
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  All 
Husband  25.832*** 47.155*** 33.772***  22.089**  29.763*** 45.520*** 57.382*** 62.896*** 62.948*** 62.159*** 68.534*** 95.445***  40.182*** 
  (2.80) (5.02) (3.82) (2.29) (2.92) (4.26) (5.43) (5.07) (4.94) (4.91) (4.90) (6.50)  (12.38) 
Age  2.377*** 2.881*** 2.292*** 2.110*** 2.508*** 2.491*** 2.088*** 2.238*** 2.300*** 2.318*** 2.515*** 2.712***  2.619*** 
  (9.94) (9.91) (8.80) (7.54) (8.50) (7.90) (6.65) (6.09) (6.19) (5.85) (5.76) (5.58)  (25.99) 
Age  squared  -0.032*** -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.034*** 
  (11.53)  (10.77)  (9.97) (8.72) (9.47) (8.71) (7.25) (6.41) (6.59) (6.18) (5.60) (5.25)  (27.92) 
Education  1.104*** 1.048*** 1.174*** 1.178*** 1.130*** 1.252*** 1.385*** 1.384*** 1.347*** 1.666*** 1.884*** 2.105***  1.360*** 
  (15.69) (13.84) (16.27) (16.11) (16.04) (15.50) (16.56) (15.29) (13.82) (15.60) (17.63) (18.89)  (53.96) 
N o .   o f   c h i l d r e n                 
    Preschool  -1.988**  -2.217*** -2.491*** -4.249*** -5.215*** -3.345***  -1.632  0.233  -0.055  -2.425*  -1.059  -0.756  -2.262*** 
  (2.52) (2.83) (3.29) (4.88) (6.24) (2.88) (1.40) (0.20) (0.04) (1.78) (0.79) (0.51)  (7.68) 
    School-age  -1.604*** -2.181***  -1.237**  -2.389*** -4.749*** -2.995***  -0.974  0.823  -0.678  -2.254**  -3.022***  -2.574**  -2.078*** 
  (3.65) (4.24) (2.46) (4.02) (6.12) (3.73) (1.22) (0.99) (0.69) (2.43) (3.09) (2.24)  (11.25) 
    Adolescent  -1.787*** -2.167*** -2.282*** -2.070*** -2.746*** -3.175***  -1.448*  -0.281  -0.112  -1.722*  -1.735*  -2.214*  -2.072*** 
  (3.66) (4.27) (4.68) (3.42) (4.41) (4.20) (1.92) (0.34) (0.12) (1.77) (1.69) (1.72)  (12.16) 
    Adult  -4.763*** -5.009*** -4.284*** -4.856*** -6.715*** -7.759*** -6.784*** -5.721*** -5.798*** -6.033*** -6.709*** -6.515*** -5.902*** 
  (11.07) (11.84) (11.43) (11.23) (15.16) (15.93) (12.28)  (9.58)  (8.98)  (9.17)  (9.02)  (7.37)  (39.82) 
No.  of  adult  co-residents  -2.524*** -1.696*** -2.500*** -2.927*** -5.040*** -4.531*** -2.613*** -3.300*** -2.428*** -3.862*** -3.746*** -3.130***  -3.130*** 
  (5.89) (3.26) (4.60) (5.95)  (11.47)  (8.39) (4.51) (5.89) (4.00) (6.22) (5.90) (3.98)  (21.67) 
Non-labor  income  -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (8.80)  (13.44)  (5.54) (4.26) (8.76)  (10.07)  (9.82) (10.35) (8.45) (11.47)  (12.84) (7.74)  (19.29) 
Interactions  with  husband                
    Age*husband  -0.922**  -1.914*** -1.280***  -0.868*  -0.965**  -1.493*** -1.476*** -1.726*** -1.744*** -1.840*** -1.779*** -2.508*** -1.305*** 
  (2.17) (4.29) (3.12) (1.90) (2.03) (3.04) (3.07) (3.00) (3.01) (3.26) (2.83) (3.72)  (8.59) 
    Age  squared*husband  0.016*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 
  (3.31) (5.15) (4.48) (3.14) (3.02) (3.82) (3.68) (3.40) (3.55) (4.02) (3.07) (3.43)  (11.02) 
    Education*husband  -0.987*** -0.797*** -1.111*** -1.057*** -1.124*** -1.265*** -1.284*** -1.286*** -1.155*** -1.596*** -1.762*** -1.696***  -1.244*** 
  (9.84)  (7.35)  (11.12) (10.18) (11.24) (11.00) (10.67)  (9.98)  (8.38)  (10.77) (11.51) (10.23)  (34.42) 
  Preschool  children*husband  4.679***  2.258*  5.325***  6.154***  3.475***  1.793  2.027  -0.741  -1.590  4.719**  3.822*  -1.157  2.273*** 
  (3.77) (1.92) (4.64) (4.39) (2.70) (1.04) (1.18) (0.43) (0.79) (2.28) (1.93) (0.54)  (5.11) 
  School-age  children*husband  2.836***  2.447***  1.673**  3.324***  0.523  1.368  0.059  -2.464**  -0.698  1.518  3.412**  0.780  0.981*** 
  (4.07) (3.08) (2.24) (3.71) (0.43) (1.13) (0.05) (2.08) (0.49) (1.09) (2.34) (0.47)  (3.54) 
    Adolescent  children*husband  1.045  1.831** 2.403*** 1.709**  1.225  1.805  1.265  -1.022  -1.848  1.457  1.678  2.165  0.388 
  (1.40) (2.34) (3.23) (1.97) (1.27) (1.55) (1.10) (0.82) (1.34) (1.02) (1.10) (1.16)  (1.51) 
    Adult  children*husband  0.961  0.706 -0.547 -0.535 -0.297 0.748 -0.228 -1.473 -1.354  -1.742* 0.900  0.131  -0.282 
  (1.43) (1.05) (0.93) (0.78) (0.43) (0.94) (0.27) (1.62) (1.44) (1.83) (0.78) (0.09)  (1.22) 
    Co-residents*husband  0.574 -0.231 0.291 1.140 0.614 0.845  -2.996***  -1.775**  -2.841***  -1.100  -2.304**  -3.391***  0.017 
  (0.87) (0.31) (0.35) (1.56) (0.92) (0.97) (3.35) (1.96) (3.13) (1.21) (2.37) (2.92)  (0.08) 
    Non-labor  income*husband  -0.003*** -0.001***  -0.001  -0.001  -0.003**  -0.003***  -0.001  -0.001*  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001***  -0.001* -0.001*** 
  (3.76) (2.88) (1.57) (1.35) (2.03) (3.50) (1.52) (1.76) (3.42) (3.98) (3.02) (1.80)  (5.42) 
                
Y e a r                - 0 . 2 2 8 * * *  
               ( 9 . 6 2 )  
Year*husband               0.608*** 
               ( 1 7 . 3 6 )  
Observations  5006 4518 5220 5352 6448 5746 5626 5662 5546 5650 5482 5092  65348 
R-squared  0.40 0.37 0.39 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.26  0.31 
Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; All regressions include provincial dummies. All economic variables are derived using the 1988 price level.   28
 
Table 5: OLS Estimates of the Gender Gap in Various Specifications (both husbands and wives are labor market participants; dependent variable: share of labor income ) 
  1988  1989 1990  1991 1992 1993 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 1999  All 
                      
Specification same as Table 3 (no interactions)                 
                      
Husband  7.717***  7.431*** 7.416***  8.107*** 7.797*** 9.027***  10.229***  9.813***  10.178***  10.856***  10.223***  11.485***  6.835*** 
  (26.32) (24.21)  (26.56)  (27.11)  (27.35)  (27.09)  (28.10) (25.95) (25.68) (25.05) (22.13)  (22.71)  (39.72) 
Year*husband                     0.432*** 
                     (13.69) 
Specification same as Table 4 (with interactions)                 
                      
Husband  27.088*** 53.218***  35.125***  29.032***  29.930***  36.612***  47.731*** 45.873*** 50.398*** 48.084*** 71.170***  100.713***  37.339*** 
  (3.18) (5.70)  (4.13)  (3.06)  (2.86)  (3.18)  (3.97) (3.57) (3.75) (3.60) (5.03)  (6.62)  (11.13) 
Year*husband                     0.558*** 
                     (16.35) 
                     
 
Note: All specifications include the same set of independent variables as regressions reported in Table 3. Robust t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%; All regressions include provincial dummies. All economic variables are derived using the 1988 price level. 
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
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or wives’ labor earnings in 

























              
















































              
Number of Children              
    Preschool  children  0.185   0.154   0.119   0.145   0.128   0.106   0.102   0.097   0.080   0.082   0.082   0.074   
  (0.39) (0.37) (0.33) (0.36) (0.34) (0.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) 
     School-age  children  0.393   0.379   0.368   0.340   0.331   0.328   0.300   0.277   0.252   0.241   0.222   0.208   
  (0.55) (0.53) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.46) (0.44) (0.44) (0.42) (0.41) 
     Adolescent  children  0.338   0.341   0.306   0.286   0.253   0.249   0.243   0.261   0.279   0.266   0.253   0.244   
  (0.61) (0.59) (0.55) (0.54) (0.50) (0.48) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (0.43) 
     A d u l t   c h i l d r e n   0.397   0.429   0.450   0.407   0.421   0.423   0.403   0.404   0.399   0.416   0.417   0.416   
  (0.74) (0.77) (0.79) (0.73) (0.74) (0.73) (0.71) (0.71) (0.70) (0.72) (0.69) (0.66) 
              
Number of adult co-residents  0.031   0.025   0.028   0.032   0.030   0.028   0.025   0.029   0.065   0.032   0.037   0.031   
  (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.25) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) 
              


























              
              
No. of Observations  5006 4518 5220 5352 6448 5746 5626 5662 5546 5650 5482 5092 
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Table A2: Non-Labor Force Participation of Husbands and Wives by Categories in Urban China, 1988-1999   
 
Husbands/year  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 
                   
Retirees  218*  225* 262* 254* 452 459 520 507 544 525 573  651 
Disabled  workers  -  -  -  -  0 0 0 0 0 1 1  2 
Household  workers  -  -  -  -  0 0 1 1 1 3 1  2 
Students  -  -  -  -  0 0 0 1 1 0 1  0 
Waiting for entry to higher education  -  -  -  -  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Others  -  -  -  -  3 2 2 0 3 3 5  6 
                   
Non-labor  force  number  236  241  275  276  455 461 523 509 549 532 581  661 
No. of Observations  2503  2259  2610  2676  3224 2873 2813 2831 2773 2825 2741  2546 
                   
Remarks:                   
Unemployed  3  2  0  3  3 6 3 4 3 6  15 24 
 
Wives/year  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 
                   
Retirees  267*  292* 347* 360* 563 577 637 639  688  672  750  779 
Disabled  workers  -  -  -  -  6 7 6 7 3 9 9  2 
Household  workers  -  -  -  -  78 78 82 69 74 87 78  87 
Students  -  -  -  -  1 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Waiting for entry to higher education  -  -  -  -  0  0  0  2  1  0  0  0 
Others  -  -  -  -  79 73 85 61 70 54 67  64 
                   
Non-labor force number  401  416  475  506  727  735  810  778  836  822  904  932 
No. of Observations  2503  2259  2610  2676  3224 2873 2813 2831 2773 2825 2741  2546 
                   
Remarks:                   
Unemployed  7  5  9  10  17 20 28 34 27 40 71  61 
* Early surveys (1988-1991) do not report whether one is retired. Retirees in these years are classified as those with zero labor income and positive retirement income. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of the Share of Husband’/Wife’s Labor Income in Total Family 
Income 
in Urban China in 1988, 1994 and 1999 
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